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A  set  of  coalition  structures  P  is  farsightedly  stable  (i)  if  all  possible  deviations  from  any  coalition 
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or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any coalition structure outside the 
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first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of 
unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted 
stability  and  other  concepts  such  as  the  largest  consistent  set  and  the  von  Neumann-Morgenstern 
farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with 
positive spillovers. 
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authors. 1 Introduction
Many social, economic and political activities are conducted by groups or coalitions
of individuals. For example, consumption takes place within households or families;
production is carried out by ￿rms which are large coalitions of owners of di⁄erent
factors of production; workers are organized in trade unions or professional associ-
ations; public goods are produced within a complex coalition structure of federal,
state, and local jurisdictions; political life is conducted through political parties and
interest groups; and individuals belong to networks of formal and informal social
clubs.
The formation of coalitions has been studied adopting either the cooperative
game-theoretic approach or the noncooperative one. The cooperative approach has
￿rst proposed myopic notions of stability such as core-stability, ￿-stability or ￿-
stability (see Hart and Kurz [6]). These concepts assume that deviations cannot be
countered by subsequent deviations. Then, farsighted notions of stability such as
the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set or the largest consistent set
have been proposed (see Chwe [4]). Farsightedness of the coalitions means that a
coalition considers the possibility that, once it acts, another coalition might react,
a third coalition might in turn react, and so on without limit.1
The noncooperative approach has proposed simultaneous or sequential games of
coalition formation which are usually solved using the Nash equilibrium concept or
one of its re￿nements.2 Bloch [2] has proposed a sequential coalition formation game
which relies on the commitment assumption. Once some players have agreed to form
a coalition, they are committed to remain in that coalition. They can neither leave
the coalition nor propose to change it later on. Ray and Vohra [12] have generalized
Bloch￿ s game by allowing for an endogenous distribution of coalitional gains. How-
1Xue [14] has proposed the solution concepts of optimistic or conservative stable standards
of behavior. It strengthens the farsightedness notion of the largest consistent set. A farsighted
individual considers only the ￿nal outcomes that might result when making choices. But, an
individual with perfect foresight considers also how ￿nal outcomes can be reached. That is, possible
deviations along the way to the ￿nal outcomes should be considered. Barbera and Gerber [1]
have proposed a solution concept for hedonic coalition formation games: durability. This concept
assumes some form of maxmin behavior on the part of farsighted players.
2For the coalitional contingent threat situation, Mariotti [10] has de￿ned an equilibrium concept:
the coalitional equilibrium. Central to his concept is the notion of coalitional strategies and the
similarity with subgame perfection (except that coalitions are formally treated as players).
1ever, sequential coalition formation games are quite sensitive to the exact coalition
formation process.3 In order to remedy the shortcomings of existing solution con-
cepts and to identify the consequences of common knowledge of rationality, Herings,
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch [7] have proposed to apply extensive-form rationaliz-
ability to the framework of social environments. A social environment constitutes
a framework in which it is possible to study how groups of players interact in a
society. On this social environment is de￿ned a multi-stage game. An outcome of
the social environment is socially rationalizable if and only if it is rationalizable in
the multi-stage game. The set of socially rationalizable outcomes is shown to be
non-empty for all social environments and it can be computed by an iterative reduc-
tion procedure. This noncooperative approach is very appealing but it can be hard
to compute socially rationalizable outcomes. However, the cooperative notions of
farsighted stability take into account the long run and farsightedly stable outcomes
are less demanding in terms of computations.
The objective of this paper is to provide a new stability concept to predict which
coalition structures are likely to emerge in the long run when coalition members are
farsighted. A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible
deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure
outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse o⁄ or equally well o⁄, (ii) if
there exists a farsighted improving path from any coalition structure outside the set
leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset
of P satisfying the ￿rst two conditions. In contrast to other concepts incorporating
farsightedness, we do not only request that all possible deviations out of the set are
deterred by the threat of ending worse o⁄, but also that there exists a farsighted
improving path from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition
structure in the set. This property is equivalent to the requirement that coalition
structures within the set are robust to perturbations. This new stability concept was
originally de￿ned by Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch [8] for network formation
models. In Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch [8] the set of states was the set
of networks and the possible moves from one network were restricted to pairwise
deviations. Here, the set of states is the set of coalition structures and the possible
moves from one coalition structure allow for coalitional deviations.
3Konishi and Ray [9] have studied a model of dynamic coalition formation where players evaluate
the desirability of a move in terms of its consequences on the entire discounted stream of payo⁄s.
2A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characteriza-
tion of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures. We have that any
von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set is also a farsightedly stable set.
By means of examples, we show that farsightedly stable sets have no relationship
to largest consistent sets. Finally, we apply our new concept to coalition forma-
tion games satisfying the properties of positive spillovers, negative association and
e¢ ciency of the grand coalition. We obtain that, contrary to myopic notions of
stability, the set consisting of the grand coalition is always a farsightedly stable set.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations and
basic notions of farsightedness. In Section 3 we de￿ne the notion of farsightedly
stable sets of coalition structures. In Section 4 we illustrate our results by means of
coalition formation games with positive spillovers. In Section 5 we conclude.
2 Coalition formation
The players are forming coalitions and inside each coalition formed the members
share the coalitional gains from cooperation. Let P be the ￿nite set of coalition
structures. A coalition structure p = fS1;S2;:::;Smg is a partition of the player
set N = f1;2;:::;ng, so Si 6= ? for i = 1;:::;m; Si \ Sj = ? for i 6= j; and
Sm
i=1 Si = N. Let #Si be the cardinality of coalition Si. Gains from cooperation
are described by a valuation V; a mapping from the set of coalition structures P into
vectors of payo⁄s in Rn. The component Vi(p) denotes the payo⁄obtained by player
i if the coalition structure p is formed.
How does the formation of coalitions proceed? A coalition structure p0 is obtain-




mg ￿ p0 such that [m
i=1S0
i = T. Condition (i) means that if
the players in T leave their respective coalition(s) in p, the non-deviating players do
not move. Condition (ii) allows the deviating players in T to form one or several
coalitions in the new status-quo p0. Non-deviating players do not belong to those
new coalitions.
The notion of farsighted improving path captures the fact that farsighted coali-
tions consider the end coalition structure that their move(s) may lead to. That is,
a farsighted improving path is a sequence of coalition structures that can emerge
when players form coalitions based on the improvement the end coalition structure
3o⁄ers relative to the current coalition structure.
De￿nition 1. A farsighted improving path from a coalition structure p to a coalition
structure p0 6= p is a ￿nite sequence of coalition structures p1;:::;pK with p1 = p
and pK = p0 such that for any k 2 f1;:::;K ￿ 1g, pk+1 is obtainable from pk via
some coalition Sk, Vi(pK) ￿ Vi(pk) for all i 2 Sk and Vi(pK) > Vi(pk) for some
i 2 Sk.
For a given coalition structure p, let F(p) be the set of coalition structures that
can be reached by a farsighted improving path from p. Two solution concepts are
commonly used to predict which coalition structure will emerge when players are
farsighted: the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set and the largest
consistent set.
The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set (von Neumann and Morgenstern [13])
imposes internal and external stability. Incorporating the notion of farsighted im-
proving paths into the original de￿nition of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable
set, we obtain the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set.
De￿nition 2. The set P ￿ P is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set
if (i) 8p 2 P; F(p) \ P = ? and (ii) 8p0 2 P n P; F(p0) \ P 6= ?.
However, a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set does not always
exist as is shown in Example 1.
Example 1. Consider a coalition formation game among three players taken from
Diamantoudi and Xue [5].
Partitions Payo⁄s
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
f123g 0 0 0
f12;3g 3 2 1
f13;2g 2 1 3
f23;1g 1 3 2
f1;2;3g 1 1 1
In this example, f12;3g should be interpreted as the coalition structure where players






To satisfy external stability a set should include at least two coalition structures
(for instance, f12;3g and f13;2g), but then internal stability would be violated. It
follows that there is no von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. ￿
The largest consistent set is a concept that has been de￿ned in Chwe [4].
De￿nition 3. The set P ￿ P is a consistent set if for all p 2 P, for all S ￿ N, and
for all p0 2 P n fpg; where p0 is obtainable from p via S, there exists p00 2 P, where
p00 = p0 or p00 2 F(p0) such that we do not have Vi(p) ￿ Vi(p00) for all i 2 S and
Vi(p) < Vi(p00) for some i 2 S. The largest consistent set is the consistent set that
contains any consistent set.
Chwe [4] has shown that there uniquely exists a largest consistent set and has
provided the following iterative procedure to ￿nd the largest consistent set. Let
Z0 ￿ P. Then Zk (k = 1;2;:::) is inductively de￿ned as follows: p 2 Zk￿1 belongs
to Zk if and only if 8 p0 2 P n fpg; 8S ￿ N such that p0 is obtainable from p via S,
9 p00 2 Zk￿1, where p0 = p00 or p00 2 F(p0); such that we do not have Vi(p) ￿ Vi(p00)




Example 2. Consider a coalition formation game among four players where payo⁄s
are obtained from a model of pure public goods coalitions with congestion (see
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch [11]). Later on we will consider a model of pure public
goods without congestion in more detail.
Partitions Payo⁄s
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
f1234g 6 6 6 6
f123;4g 4 4 4 8
f12;34g 5 5 5 5
f12;3;4g 3 3 5:5 5:5
f1;2;3;4g 3:5 3:5 3:5 3:5










































In the ￿rst round of the iterative procedure to compute the largest consistent
set, we eliminate the coalition structures f1;2;3;4g, f12;3;4g, f13;2;4g, f14;2;3g,
f23;1;4g, f24;1;3g, and f34;1;2g. Indeed, the deviations from f1;2;3;4g to f1234g
and from f12;3;4g (or f13;2;4g or f14;2;3g or f23;1;4g or f24;1;3g or f34;1;2g)
to f1;2;3;4g are not deterred. We cannot eliminate other coalition structures
since any possible deviations from f1234g or f123;4g or f124;3g or f134;2g or
f234;1g or f12;34g or f13;24g or f14;23g are deterred. For example, the devi-
ations from either f123;4g or f12;34g to f12;3;4g by player 3 are deterred since
f123;4g 2 F(f12;3;4g) with the original deviating player obtaining again 4 as pay-
o⁄. In the second round, we cannot eliminate other coalition structures since any
possible deviations from f1234g or f123;4g or f124;3g or f134;2g or f234;1g or
f12;34g or f13;24g or f14;23g are still deterred. Therefore, the largest consistent
set is ff1234g, f123;4g, f124;3g, f134;2g, f234;1g, f12;34g, f13;24g, f14;23gg.
6So f12;34g, f13;24g and f14;23g belong to the largest consistent set even though
they are Pareto dominated by f1234g. ￿
3 Farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures
We now give the de￿nition of a farsightedly stable set of coalition structures. This
concept was originally de￿ned by Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch [8] for net-
work formation models with pairwise deviations.
De￿nition 4. The set P ￿ P is a farsightedly stable set if
(i) 8 p 2 P, 8 p0 = 2 P such that p0 is obtainable from p via S ￿ N, 9p00 2 F(p0)\P
such that we do not have Vi(p) ￿ Vi(p00) for all i 2 S and Vi(p) < Vi(p00) for
some i 2 S.
(ii) 8p0 2 P n P; F(p0) \ P 6= ?:
(iii) @ P 0   P such that P 0 satis￿es Conditions (i) and (ii).
Condition (i) in De￿nition 4 requires the deterrence of external deviations. It
captures that any deviation to a coalition structure outside of P, is deterred by the
threat of ending in p00. Here p00 is such that there is a farsighted improving path from
p0 to p00. Moreover, p00 belongs to P, which makes p00 a credible threat. Condition (ii)
in De￿nition 4 requires external stability and implies that the coalition structures
within the set are robust to perturbations. From any coalition structure outside
of P there is a farsighted improving path leading to some coalition structure in P.
Condition (ii) implies that if a set of coalition structures is farsightedly stable, it
is non-empty. Notice that the set P (trivially) satis￿es Conditions (i) and (ii) in
De￿nition 4. This motivates the requirement of a minimality condition, namely
Condition (iii).
Proposition 1. A farsightedly stable set of coalition structures exists.
All the proofs not in the main text are directly obtained from those in Herings,
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch [8]. Replacing the internal stability condition in the von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set by deterrence of external deviations
and minimality, leads to a stability concept that is always non-empty. We now
provide an easy to verify condition for a set P to be farsightedly stable.
7Proposition 2. If for every p0 2 PnP we have F(p0)\P 6= ? and for every p 2 P;
F(p) \ P = ?, then P is a farsightedly stable set.
A coalition structure p is core-stable if for any S ￿ N, p0 2 P that is obtainable
from p via S and i 2 S such that Vi(p0) > Vi(p), there exists j 2 S such that
Vj(p0) < Vj(p). Proposition 2 implies that if P is the unique farsightedly stable set
and the coalition structure p belongs to P, then F(p) = ?, which implies that p is
core-stable. Thus, farsighted stability is a re￿nement of core-stability when there
is a unique farsightedly stable set. From Proposition 2 it is immediate that if P is
a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set, then P is a farsightedly stable
set.
Proposition 3. The set fpg is a farsightedly stable set if and only if for every
p0 2 P n fpg we have p 2 F(p0).
This proposition tells us that fpg is a farsightedly stable set if and only if there
exists a farsighted improving path from any coalition structure leading to p. Con-
dition (iii) implies that if fpg is a farsightedly stable set, then p does not belong
to any other farsightedly stable set. But there may be farsightedly stable sets not
containing p.
Since internal stability is automatically satis￿ed when a set of coalition struc-
tures contains only one element, we have from Proposition 3 that the set fpg is a
farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly
stable set.
Proposition 4. The set P is the unique farsightedly stable set if and only if P =
fp 2 P j F(p) = ?g and for every p0 2 P n P, F(p0) \ P 6= ?.
From Proposition 4 we immediately get the next result: if P is the unique
farsightedly stable set, then P is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly
stable set.
Corollary 1. The set fpg is the unique farsightedly stable set if and only if for
every p0 2 P n fpg we have p 2 F(p0) and F(p) = ?.
If for every p0 2 P n fpg we have p 2 F(p0), then fpg is a farsightedly stable set.
If, moreover, F(p) = ?, then fpg is the unique farsightedly stable set. If, on the
other hand, F(p) 6= ?, then there is another farsightedly stable set.
8Example 3. Consider a coalition formation game among four players where payo⁄s
are obtained from a cartel formation game (see Mauleon and Vannetelbosch [11]).
Partitions Payo⁄s
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
f123g 12 12 12
f12;3g 8 8 16
f13;2g 8 16 8
f23;1g 16 8 8
f1;2;3g 9 9 9
We have
F(f123g) = ff12;3g;f13;2g;f23;1gg;
F(f12;3g) = F(f13;2g) = F(f23;1g) = ff123g;f1;2;3gg;
F(f1;2;3g) = ff123gg:
The set ff123gg is a farsightedly stable set, though not the unique one since
F(f123g) 6= ?. The set P = ff12;3g, f13;2g, f23;1g, f1;2;3gg also constitutes a
farsightedly stable set. Thus, any deviation to a coalition structure outside P is de-
terred and from any coalition structure outside of P there is a farsighted improving
path going into P. It is easy to verify that a subset of P would not satisfy Condition
(ii) of the de￿nition of a farsightedly stable set. ￿
In Example 1 there is no von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set.
Moreover, there is no p such that F(p) = ?. Hence, there is more than one farsight-
edly stable set. In fact, ff12;3g;f13;2gg, ff13;2g;f23;1gg; and ff12;3g;f23;1gg
are the farsightedly stable sets. In Example 2 we have more than one farsightedly
stable set since there is no p such that F(p) = ?. It can be veri￿ed that ff1234gg,
ff123;4gg, ff124;3gg, ff134;2gg; and ff234;1gg are the farsightedly stable sets of
coalition structures.
The next proposition tells us that if a coalition structure does not belong to the
largest consistent set, it cannot be a farsightedly stable set of coalition structures.
Proposition 5. If fpg is a farsightedly stable set, then p belongs to the largest
consistent set.
There is no general relationship between the largest consistent set and farsight-
edly stable sets. Example 2 shows that the largest consistent set may contain other
9coalition structures. The coalition structures f12;34g, f13;24g and f14;23g be-
long to the largest consistent set but do not belong to any farsightedly stable set.
However, Example 3 shows that farsightedly stable sets may contain other coalition
structures too. Indeed, the set P = ff12;3g;f13;2g;f23;1g;f1;2;3gg is a farsight-
edly stable set, but none of the coalition structures belonging to P do belong to
the largest consistent set. Indeed, the largest consistent set singles out the grand
coalition fNg.
4 Coalition formation with positive spillovers
Gains are assumed to be positive, Vi (p) > 0 for all i 2 N, for all p 2 P. We
consider n ￿ 3. We assume symmetric or identical players and equal sharing of the
coalitional gains among coalition members.4 That is, in any coalition Si belonging
to p, Vj (p) = Vl (p) for all j;l 2 Si, i = 1;:::;m. So, let V (Si;p) denote the payo⁄
obtained by any player belonging to Si in the coalition structure p. We focus on
coalition formation games satisfying the following conditions on the per-member
payo⁄s.
(P.1) Positive Spillovers. V (Si;(pnfS1;S2g) [ fS1 [ S2g) > V (Si;p) for all players
belonging to Si, Si 6= S1;S2.
Condition (P.1) restricts our analysis to games with positive spillovers, where the
formation of a coalition by other players increases the payo⁄ of a player.
(P.2) Negative Association. V (Si;p) < V (Sj;p) if and only if jSij > jSjj.
Condition (P.2) imposes that, in any coalition structure, small coalitions have higher
per-member payo⁄s than big coalitions.





4Ray and Vohra [12] have provided a justi￿cation for the assumption of an equal sharing rule.
In an in￿nite-horizon model of coalition formation among symmetric players with endogenous
bargaining, they have shown that in any equilibrium without delay there is equal sharing.
10Finally, condition (P.3) assumes that the grand coalition is the only e¢ cient coalition
structure with respect to payo⁄s.
A ￿rst economic situation satisfying the three conditions is a cartel formation
game with Cournot competition as in Bloch [3] and Yi [15]. Let ￿ (q) = a ￿ q be
the inverse demand (q is the industry output). The industry consists of n identical
￿rms. Inside each cartel, we assume equal sharing of the bene￿ts obtained from the
cartel￿ s production. Once stable agreements on cartel formation have been reached,
we observe a Cournot competition among the cartels. The payo⁄ for each ￿rm in
each possible coalition structure is well de￿ned. Firm i￿ s cost function is given by
cqi, where qi is ￿rm i￿ s output and c (a > c) is the common constant marginal cost.




#S (#p + 1)
2,
where #p is the number of cartels within p. Output cartels in a Cournot oligopoly
with the inverse demand function ￿(q) = a ￿ q and the cost function c(qi) = cqi
satisfy (P.1)-(P.3). Yi [15] has shown that conditions (P.1) and (P.2) are satis￿ed.
It is straightforward to show that (P.3) is also satis￿ed.
A second economic situation satisfying the three conditions are economies with
pure public goods. The economy consists of n agents. At cost ci(qi), agent i can
provide qi units of the public good. Let q =
P
i qi be the total amount of public
good. The utility each agent obtains from the public good depends positively on
the total amount of public good provided: Ui(q) = q for all i 2 N. Each agent owns
a technology to produce the public good, and the cost of producing the amount qi
of the public good is given by ci(qi) = 1
2(qi)2. Since individual cost functions are
convex and exhibit decreasing returns to scale, it is cheaper to produce an amount q
of public goods using all technologies than by using a single technology. In stage one
the coalition formation takes place. Inside each coalition, we assume equal sharing
of the production. Once a coalition structure has been formed, each coalition of
agents acts noncooperatively. On the contrary, inside every coalition, agents act
cooperatively and the level of public good is chosen to maximize the sum of utilities
of the coalition members. That is, for any coalition structure p = fS1;S2;:::;Smg,















11yielding a total level of public good provision for the coalition Si equal to qSi =
(#Si)










for all agents belonging to Si, i = 1;:::;m. Yi [15] has shown that conditions (P.1)
and (P.2) are again satis￿ed. It is straightforward to show that (P.3) is also satis￿ed.
A set consisting of the grand coalition structure fNg only, the e¢ cient coalition
structure, is a farsightedly stable set.
Proposition 6. Under (P.1)-(P.3), ffNgg is a farsightedly stable set.
Proof. To prove that ffNgg is a farsightedly stable set, we have to show that for
all p 6= fNg we have fNg 2 F(p). The proof is done in two steps.
Step A. Since the per-member payo⁄s satisfy negative association and e¢ ciency of
the grand coalition, the players belonging to the coalition with the highest number
of members in any p di⁄erent from fNg are worse o⁄than in fNg. Also, all players
prefer fNg to p = fS1;:::;Sng with #Si = 1 for all Si 2 p. Step B. Take the
sequence of moves where at each move one player belonging to the biggest coalition
in the current coalition structure deviates to form a singleton, until the coalition
structure p is reached. From p the grand coalition deviates to fNg: By (A)-(B) we
have that fNg 2 F(p) for all p 6= fNg.
However, it may be that ffNgg is not the unique farsightedly stable set of coali-
tion structures. In the cartel formation game, ffNgg is not the unique farsightedly
stable set for n ￿ 3. Mauleon and Vannetelbosch [11] have shown that the grand
coalition structure fNg always belongs to the largest consistent set, and is possibly
stable by itself. For instance, the largest consistent set singles out the grand coali-
tion fNg for n ￿ 4: But as #N grows, many coalition structures may belong to the
largest consistent set. In the public good game, the set ffNgg is not the unique
farsightedly stable set when n ￿ 4. Finally, notice that the set ffNgg is also a von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Hence, under (P.1)-(P.3), the grand
coalition is a farsightedly stable set, a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable
set, and belongs to the largest consistent set.
Finally, notice that in both the cartel formation game and in the public good
game, core-stability, ￿-stability, ￿-stability and Bloch￿ s sequential game do not se-
lect the grand coalition (see Bloch [2]). For instance, any symmetric stationary
12perfect equilibria of Bloch￿ s sequential game of cartel formation only support cartel




1 is the ￿rst integer following (2n + 3 ￿
p
4n + 5)=2 and #S￿
j = 1 for j = 2;:::;m.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a concept, farsighted stable set of coalition structures, to predict
which coalition structures may be formed among farsighted players. A set of coali-
tion structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition
structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the
threat of ending worse o⁄or equally well o⁄, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving
path from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure
in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying Conditions (i) and (ii).
A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We have provided a characteri-
zation of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we have studied
the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest
consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Any von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set belongs to the largest consistent set
and is a farsightedly stable set. By means of examples we have shown that there
is no general relationship between farsightedly stable sets and the largest consistent
set. Finally, we have illustrated our results by analyzing coalition formation games
with positive spillovers.
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